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Abstract
We provide a new modus operandi for the computation of the nucleolus in coop-
erative games with transferable utility. Using the concept of dual game we extend
the theory of characterization sets. Dually essential and dually saturated coalitions
determine both the core and the nucleolus in monotonic games whenever the core
is non-empty. We show how these two sets are related with the existing charac-
terization sets. In particular we prove that if the grand coalition is vital then the
intersection of essential and dually essential coalitions forms a characterization set
itself. We conclude with a sample computation of the nucleolus of bankruptcy games
- the shortest of its kind.
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, Nucleolus, Characterization sets
JEL-codes: C71
1 Introduction
The nucleolus, developed by Schmeidler (1969), soon became one of the most frequently
applied solution concepts of cooperative game theory. Despite its good properties it lost
some popularity in the last 20 or so years. Very much like the Shapley-value it suffers
from computational difficulties. While the former has an explicit formula and various
axiomatizations, the nucleolus can only be computed by an LP and its axiomatization is
less straightforward.
Computing the nucleolus is a notoriously hard problem, evenNP-hard for some classes
of games. While NP-hardness was proven for minimum cost spanning tree games (Faigle,
Kern, and Kuipers, 1998), voting games (Elkind, Goldberg, Goldberg, and Wooldridge,
2009) and flow and linear production games (Deng, Fang, and Sun, 2009), it is still
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unknown whether the corresponding decision problem  i.e. verifying whether an allocation
is the nucleolus or not  belongs to NP or not.
In recent years several polynomial time algorithms were proposed to find the nucleolus
of important families of cooperative games, like standard tree, assignment, matching and
bankruptcy games (Maschler, Potters, and Reijnierse, 2010; Solymosi and Raghavan, 1994;
Kern and Paulusma, 2003; Aumann and Maschler, 1985). In addition Kuipers (1996) and
Arin and Inarra (1998) developed methods to compute the nucleolus for convex games.
The main breakthrough came from another direction. In their seminal paper Maschler,
Peleg, and Shapley (1979) described the geometric properties of the nucleolus and devised
a computational framework in the form of a sequence of linear programs. Although these
LPs consist of exponentially many inequalities they can be solved efficiently if one knows
which constraints are redundant. Huberman (1980); Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998);
Reijnierse and Potters (1998) provided methods to identify coalitions that correspond to
non-redundant constraints.
Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998) provided the most fruitful approach. They introduced
the concept of characterization set which is a collection of coalitions that determines the
nucleolus by itself. They proved that if the size of the characterization set is polynomially
bounded in the number of players, then the nucleolus of the game can be computed in
strongly polynomial time. A collection that characterizes the nucleolus in one game need
not characterize it in another one. Thus we are interested in characterization sets that
are universal, i.e. that yield the nucleolus in every TU-game.
Huberman (1980) was the first to show that such a collection exists. He introduced
the concept of essential coalitions which are coalitions that have no weakly minorizing
partition. Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998) provided another collection that characterize
the nucleolus in cost games with non-empty cores. Saturated coalitions contain all the
players that can join the coalition without imposing extra cost.
We introduce two new characterization sets: dually essential and dually saturated
coalitions. We show that each dually inessential coalition has a weakly minorizing overlap-
ping decomposition which consists exclusively of dually essential coalitions. Thus dually
essential coalitions determine the core, and if the core is non-empty they determine the
nucleolus as well. If every player contributes to the value of a coalition then such coalition
is called dually saturated. We show that dually saturated coalitions also determine the
core, and if the core is non-empty, then also the nucleolus of a TU-game.
The larger a characterization set is the easier to uncover it in a particular game class.
However with smaller characterization set it comes a faster LP. Hence there is a tradeoff
between the difficulty in identifying the members of a characterization set and its efficiency.
In order to exploit this technique we analyze the relationship of the four known universal
characterization sets. We prove that essential coalitions are a subset of dually saturated
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coalitions in monotonic profit games and that dually essential coalitions are a subset of
saturated coalition in case of monotonic cost games. We show that in general essential
and dually essential coalitions do not contain each other. In fact for additive games their
intersection is trivial (consist of the grand coalition only). We prove that if the grand
coalition is vital then the intersection of essential and dually essential coalitions forms a
characterization set itself.
2 Game theoretical framework
A cooperative game with transferable utility is an ordered pair (N, v) consisting of the
player set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a characteristic function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. The
value v(S) represents the worth of coalition S. No matter how other players behave if the
players of S work together they can secure themselves v(S) amount of payoff. The set N
 when viewed as a coalition  is called the grand coalition.
Definition 1. A cooperative game (N, v) is called monotonic if
S ⊆ T ⊆ N ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T ).
and superadditive if
(S, T ⊂ N, S ∩ T = ∅) ⇒ v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
In superadditive games two disjoint coalitions can always merge without losing money.
Hence we shall assume that players form the grand coalition. The main question is then
how to distribute v(N) among the players in some fair way.
A solution for a cooperative game Γ = (N, v) is a vector x ∈ RN that represents
the payoff of each player. For convenience, we introduce the following notations x(S) =∑
i∈S xi for any S ⊆ N , and instead of x({i}) we simply write x(i). A solution is called
efficient if x(N) = v(N) and individually rational if x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N . The
imputation set of the game I(Γ) consists of the efficient and individually rational solutions,
formally,
I(Γ) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N), x(i) ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N}.
Given an allocation x ∈ RN , we define the satisfaction of a coalition S as
satΓ(S, x) := x(S)− v(S).
The core of the cooperative game C(Γ) is a set-valued solution where all the satisfaction
values are non-negative. Formally,
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C(Γ) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
Definition 2. A cooperative game (N, v) is convex if the characteristic function is su-
permodular i.e.
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), ∀ S, T ⊆ N.
Deriving results for convex games is a less challenging task than in general due to their
nice structure. Here we only mention a result of ?, namely that the core of a convex game
is not empty.
In many economic situations cooperation results in cost saving rather than profit
growth. For instance such situation occurs when customers would like to gain access to
some public service or public facility. The question is then, how to share the costs of
the service. Cost allocation games can be modeled in a similar fashion as cooperative
TU-games.
A cooperative cost game is an ordered pair (N, c) consisting of the player set N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} and a characteristic cost function c : 2N → R with c(∅) = 0. The value c(S)
represent how much cost coalition S must bear if it chooses to act separately from the rest
of the players. In most cases c is monotonic and subadditive. That is the more people
use the service the more it costs, however there is also an increase of efficiency.
Definition 3. A cost game (N, c) is called subadditive if
(S, T ⊂ N, S ∩ T = ∅) ⇒ c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ).
and concave if,
c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ), ∀ S, T ⊆ N.
It is possible to associate a profit game (N, v) with a cost game (N, c), called the
savings game, which is given by v(S) =
∑
i∈S c(i) − c(S) for all S ⊆ N . Note that
a cost game is subadditive (concave) if and only if the corresponding savings game is
superadditive (convex). Similarly the relationship is reversed in all the previously listed
concepts such as individual rationality, satisfaction, the core and so on. Formally, let
Γ = (N, c) be a cost game and x ∈ RN an arbitrary allocation. The satisfaction of a
coalition S is defined as
satΓ(S, x) := c(S)− x(S).
As we pointed out in case of cost games the order of the characteristic function and
the payoff vector is reversed, hence the formula for satΓ depends on whether Γ is a cost
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or profit game. However, the essence of the satΓ(S, x) expression does not change. It still
indicates the contentment of coalition S under payoff vector x.
In a cost game (N, c) we say that x is individually rational if x(i) ≤ c(i) for all i ∈ N
and x is a core member if all the satisfaction values are non-negative. Notice that core
vectors of monotonic profit and cost games are non-negative. Indeed,
x(i) = x(N)− x(N \ i) ≥ c(N)− c(N \ i) ≥ 0
for any core allocation x and i ∈ N . For profit games this is even more trivial since
x(i) ≥ v(i) ≥ v(∅) = 0.
We say that a vector x ∈ Rm lexicographically precedes y ∈ Rm (denoted by x  y) if
either x = y or there exists a number 1 ≤ j < m such that xi = yi if i < j and xj < yj.
Let Γ = (N, v) be a game and let θ(x) ∈ R2n be the satisfaction vector that contains the
2n satisfaction values in a non-decreasing order.
Definition 4. The nucleolus of Γ with respect to X is the set of allocations of a game
x ∈ Rn+ that lexicographically maximizes θ(x) over X. Formally,
N (Γ, X) = {x ∈ X | θ(y)  θ(x) for all y ∈ X}.
It is well known that if X is nonempty and compact then N (Γ, X) 6= ∅ and if X is
convex then N (Γ, X) consist of a single point (for proof see (Schmeidler, 1969)). Fur-
thermore the nucleolus is a continuous function of the characteristic function. If X is
chosen to be the set of allocations, we speak of the prenucleolus of Γ, if X is the set of
imputations then we speak of the nucleolus of Γ. Throughout the paper we will use the
shorthand notation N (Γ) for N (Γ, I(Γ)).
3 Characterization sets
The concept of characterization sets was already used by Megiddo (1974), but somehow
went unnoticed at that time. Later Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998) and Reijnierse and
Potters (1998) re-introduced the idea almost simultaneously. It is remarkable that two
such closely related and revolutionary papers appeared in the same year. Here we will
use the formalism of Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998).
Definition 5. Let ΓF = (N,F , v) be a cooperative game with coalition formation restric-
tions, where F ⊆ 2N consists of all coalitions deemed permissible. Then F is called a
characterization set for the nucleolus of the game Γ = (N, v), if N (ΓF) = N (Γ).
The main result of (Granot, Granot, and Zhu, 1998) is presented the following theorem.
We denote by eS ∈ {0, 1}N the membership vector of coalition S given by (eS)i = 1 if
i ∈ S and (eS)i = 0 otherwise.
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Theorem 6. Let Γ = (N, g) be a cooperative game, where g is either a characteristic cost
or profit function and let F ⊂ 2N . Denote by x the nucleolus of ΓF . The collection F is a
characterisation set for the nucleolus of Γ if for every S ∈ 2N \F there exists a nonempty
subcollection FS of F , such that
i. satΓ(T, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x), whenever T ∈ FS,
ii. eS can be expressed as a linear combination of {eT : T ∈ FS}.
Unfortunately the direction can not be reversed, i.e., the above conditions are sufficient
but not at all necessary. Take for example the (superadditive, but not balanced) profit
game with four players N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the following characteristic function: v(i) = 0,
v(i, j) = 1, v(i, j, k) = 4 for any i, j, k ∈ N and let v(N) = 4. Then the 2-player coalitions
and the grand coalition are sufficient to determine the nucleolus, which is given by z(i) = 1
for all i ∈ N . However the 3-player coalitions have smaller satisfaction values at z, thus the
first condition of Theorem 6 is violated. Notice that in this game the 3-player coalitions
and the grand coalition are also sufficient to determine the nucleolus.
In general neither the 2-player nor the 3-player coalitions (and the grand coalition)
characterize the nucleolus. The fact that in this example they did was due to the particular
choice (the symmetry) of the coalitional function. We would like to deal with collections
that characterize the nucleolus independently of the realization of the coalitional function.
We say that a characterization set F is universal for a class of games if it satisfies both
conditions of Theorem 6 in every game from that class of games. Special focus will be
given to the class of games with a non-empty core.
A straightforward corollary of Theorem 6 is that we can enlarge universal characteri-
sation sets arbitrarily.
Corollary 7. Let F ⊂ 2N be a characterisation set that satisfies both conditions of
Theorem 6. Then T is a characterisation set for any F ⊂ T ⊆ 2N
Now we present four universal characterization sets for balanced games. The first one
is due to Huberman (1980).
Definition 8 (Essential coalitions). Let N be a set of players, (N, v) a profit, (N, c) a
cost game. Coalition S is called essential in game Γ = (N, v) if it can not be partitioned
as S = S1
.∪ . . . .∪ Sk with k ≥ 2 such that
v(S) ≤ v(S1) + . . .+ v(Sk).
Similarly S is called essential in game Γ = (N, c) if it can not be partitioned as
S = S1
.∪ . . . .∪ Sk with k ≥ 2 such that
c(S) ≥ c(S1) + . . .+ c(Sk).
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The set of essential coalitions is denoted by E(Γ), where Γ is either (N, v) or (N, c).
By definition, the singleton coalitions are always essential in every game. It is easily
seen that in a profit / cost game each non-essential coalition has a weakly majorizing /
minorizing partition which consists exclusively of essential coalitions. Such coalitions are
called inessential. Moreover, the core is determined by the efficiency equation x(N) =
v(N) and in profit games the x(S) ≥ v(S) inequalities, while in cost games the x(S) ≤ c(S)
inequalities corresponding to the essential coalitions, all the other inequalities can be
discarded from the core system.
Huberman (1980) showed that if the core of the game is non-empty then the grand
coalition and the essential coalitions form a characterization set for the nucleolus. This
observation helps us to eliminate large coalitions which are redundant for the nucleolus.
To detect small coalitions that are unnecessary for the nucleolus, we need the concept of
dual game.
Definition 9. The dual game (N, v∗) of game (N, v) is defined by the coalitional function
v∗(S) := v(N)− v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
Clearly, v∗(∅) = 0, hence (N, v∗) is indeed a cooperative TU-game. Notice that
v∗(N) = v(N) and (v∗)∗(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N . It will be useful to think of the
dual game of a profit game as a cost game and vice versa. We can identify the small
redundant coalitions, if we apply Huberman's argument to the dual game.
Definition 10 (Dually essential coalitions). Let N be a set of players, (N, v) a profit,
(N, c) a cost game. Coalition S is called dually essential in game (N, v) if its complement
can not be partitioned as N \ S = (N \ T1)
.∪ . . . .∪ (N \ Tk) with k ≥ 2 such that
v∗(N \ S) ≥ v∗(N \ T1) + . . .+ v∗(N \ Tk),
or equivalently,
v(S) ≤ v(T1) + . . .+ v(Tk)− (k − 1)v(N).
Similarly, S is called dually essential in cost game (N, c) if its complement can not be
partitioned as N \ S = (N \ T1)
.∪ . . . .∪ (N \ Tk) with k ≥ 2 such that
c∗(N \ S) ≤ c∗(N \ T1) + . . .+ c∗(N \ Tk),
or equivalently,
c(S) ≥ c(T1) + . . .+ c(Tk)− (k − 1)c(N).
The set of dually essential coalitions is denoted by DE(Γ), where Γ is either (N, v) or
(N, c).
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Notice that each member of S appears in all of the coalitions T1, ..., Tk, but every
other player appears exactly k−1 times in this family. We call such a system of coalitions
an overlapping decomposition of S. For a more general definition, where the complements
of the overlapping coalitions need not form a partition of the complement coalition, see
e.g. Brânzei, Solymosi, and Tijs (2005) and the references therein.
By definition, all (n − 1)-player coalitions are dually essential in any game. It is
easily checked that if S and T are not dually essential coalitions and T appears in an
overlapping decomposition of S, then S cannot appear in an overlapping decomposition
of T . Consequently, in a profit / cost game each dually non-essential (dually inessential)
coalition has a weakly majorizing / weakly minorizing overlapping decomposition which
consists exclusively of dually essential coalitions. Moreover, the core of profit game (N, v)
can also be determined by the dual efficiency equation x(N) = v∗(N) and the x(S) ≤
v∗(S) dual inequalities corresponding to the complements of the dually essential coalitions,
all the other dual inequalities can be discarded from the dual core system. An analogous
statement holds for the core of cost games.
The main feature of dually essential coalitions for the nucleolus lies in the next theorem.
Theorem 11. If C(Γ) 6= ∅, then the grand coalition and the dually essential coalitions
form a characterization set for N (Γ).
Proof. There are many ways to derive this result. A formal proof can be obtained by
copying the arguments in Huberman (1980). Here we pursue another way and deduce it
from Theorem 6.
Let S be a dually inessential coalition in the balanced profit game Γ = (N, v). As
remarked earlier, S has a weakly minorizing overlapping decomposition T1, . . . , Tk (k ≥ 2)
which consists exclusively of dually essential coalitions. Hence ii. of Theorem 6 follows
immediately. The first part follows from the fact that in balanced games the nucleolus is
in the core, and for any x ∈ C(Γ)
v(S) ≤ v(T1) + . . .+ v(Tk)− (k − 1)v(N)
v(S)− x(S) ≤ v(T1) + . . .+ v(Tk)− (k − 1)x(N)− x(S)
−satΓ(S, x) ≤ −(satΓ(T1, x) + . . .+ satΓ(Tk, x))
satΓ(S, x) ≥ satΓ(T1, x) + . . .+ satΓ(Tk, x) ≥ 0,
where the second inequality comes from v(N) = x(N), while the third from the identity
x(T1) + . . . + x(Tk) = (k − 1)x(N) + x(S) implied by N \ S = (N \ T1)
.∪ . . . .∪ (N \ Tk).
The satisfaction values are non-negative for any core allocation x, hence satΓ(S, x) ≥
satΓ(Tj, x) for all j = 1, . . . , k.
The next characterization set was proposed by Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998) for
monotonic balanced cost games.
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Definition 12. A coalition S is said to be saturated in cost game (N, c) if i ∈ S whenever
c(S) = c(S ∪ {i}).
In other words if S is a saturated coalition then every new member will impose extra
cost on the coalition. A saturated coalition S said to be irreducible if there is no partition
S1, . . . , Sk of S such that Si are saturated and c(S) ≥ c(S1) + . . . + c(Sk). Let S∗(Γ)
denote the set of all irreducible saturated coalitions and
S(Γ) = S∗(Γ) ∪ {N \ i | i ∈ N} ∪ {N}.
Theorem 13. (Granot, Granot, and Zhu, 1998) Let Γ = (N, c) be a monotonic cost game
with a non-empty core, then S(Γ) forms a characterization set for N (Γ).
Similarly to the other characterization sets, S(Γ) also induces a representation of the
core C(Γ) as well. Let us mention here that just because a collection of coalitions deter-
mines the core it does not necessarily characterize the nucleolus of the game. Maschler,
Peleg, and Shapley (1979) presented two games with the same core, but with different
nucleoli.
We now convert the concept of saturatedness to monotonic profit games based on the
dualization correspondence between profit and cost games. Let (N, v) be a monotonic
profit game and S ⊆ N be an arbitrary coalition. We say that S is dually saturated if
v(S \ i) < v(S) for any i ∈ S. In other words every member contributes to the worth of
coalition S. A dually saturated coalition S said to be irreducible if there is no partition
S1, . . . , Sk of S such that Si are dually saturated and v(S) ≤ v(S1) + . . . + v(Sk). Let
DS∗(Γ) denote the set of all irreducible dually saturated coalitions and
DS(Γ) = DS∗(Γ) ∪ {i | i ∈ N} ∪ {N}.
The following definition is needed for our next theorem. Let (N, v) be a monotonic
game and S ⊆ N a dually non-saturated coalition, then we say that S 6= ∅ is a lower
closure of S if S ⊂ S, v(S) = v(S) and S is a dually saturated coalition. Note that if S
has no lower closure, then no member contributes to the worth of S or to any subset of
S. Hence v(S) = v(i) = v(∅) = 0 for any i ∈ S.
Theorem 14. Let Γ = (N, v) be a monotonic game with a non-empty core, then DS(Γ)
forms a characterization set for N (Γ).
Proof. Again we will use Theorem 6. Let S be a dually saturated but not irreducible
coalition, then there exists a partition S1, . . . , Sk of S, such that v(S) ≤ v(S1)+. . .+v(Sk).
Hence satΓ(S, x) ≥ satΓ(S1, x) + . . .+ satΓ(Sk, x). Note that we can choose S1, . . . , Sk to
be irreducible, since if one of them is not, then we take an irreducible refinement of it.
Thus S1, . . . , Sk ∈ DS(Γ).
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Now let S be a dually non-saturated coalition. If S has no lower closure then v(S) =
v(i) = 0 for any i ∈ S. From this observation also follows that satΓ({i}, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x)
for any i ∈ S and for any allocation x. Since all the singleton coalitions are included in
DS(Γ) by Theorem 6, S can be discarded. Finally let S be a lower closure of S and let
S \ S = T , then
satΓ(S, x) + x(T ) = x(S) + x(T )− v(S) = x(S)− v(S) = satΓ(S, x).
Since core vectors are non-negative this also means satΓ(S, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x) for any
x ∈ C(Γ). Now we show that satΓ({i}, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x) for any i ∈ T .
satΓ({i}, x) = x(i)− v(i) ≤ x(i) =
x(S)− x(S \ i) + v(S \ i)− v(S) =
satΓ(S, x)− satΓ(S \ i, x) ≤ satΓ(S, x)
We have shown that for any S ∈ 2N \ DS(Γ) there exist a subcollection F of DS(Γ),
such that F fulfills both conditions of Theorem 6. Hence DS(Γ) is a characterization set
for N (Γ).
Next we show a relationship between dually essential and saturated coalitions.
Lemma 15. Let Γ = (N, c) be a monotonic cost game, then DE(Γ) ⊆ S(Γ)
Proof. The grand coalition and the n− 1 player coalitions are all members of both S(Γ)
and DE(Γ). Let S be a non-saturated coalition with at most n − 2 players. We will
show that S is dually inessential. As S is not saturated there exists i ∈ N \ S such that
c(S) = c(S ∪ i). Let S1 := S ∪ i and S2 := N \ i. Then S1 ∪ S2 = N and S1 ∩ S2 = S
therefore we can use Definition 10 since
c(N) ≥ c(N \ i),
c(S) ≥ c(S) + c(N \ i)− c(N),
c(S) ≥ c(S1) + c(S2)− c(N).
In other words S appears in an overlapping decomposition of S1 and S2, therefore it can
not be dually essential.
The above lemma suggests that dually essential coalitions are more useful since they
define a smaller characterization set, which in turn implies a smaller LP. However usually
it is also harder to determine whether a coalition is dually essential or not. Saturatedness
on the other hand can be checked easily. For instance for airport games1 there exist
1This class of games was introduced by Littlechild and Owen (1973).
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at most n saturated coalitions, which can be easily determined from the characteristic
function. In fact it is enough to know the value of the singleton coalitions to identify the
saturated coalitions, which gives us an alternative way to derive an efficient algorithm for
the nucleolus.
There is a symmetrical result for essential and dually saturated coalitions.
Lemma 16. Let Γ = (N, v) be a monotonic profit game, then E(Γ) ⊆ DS(Γ).
Proof. Observe that the singleton coalitions are all members of both E(Γ) and DS(Γ).
Let S be a dually non-saturated coalition such that |S| > 1. Then there exists i ∈ S such
that v(S) = v(S \ i). By monotonicity v(i) ≥ 0, hence v(S) ≤ v(S \ i) + v(i). Thus S is
inessential.
When designing a characterisation set we may run into two kinds of difficulties. The
collection can be two small to describe (span) every other coalition. A more tricky prob-
lem is what we call a cycle in the decomposition2. This occurs when we try to discard
a coalition S using coalition T that was previously excluded because of S. For instance
the intersection of essential and dually essential coalitions do not always yield a charac-
terization set. It can happen that there is a series of coalitions S1, S2, . . . , Sk, where S`
is excluded because of S`+1 for ` = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 and Sk = S1. The circular argument
leads to a contradiction when we try to use Theorem 6 to verify that the intersection
is indeed a characterisation set. A simple example for this is any additive game. Let
Γ = (N, v) such that v(S) =
∑
i∈S v(i). Then only the singleton coalitions and the grand
coalition are essential and the (n−1)-person coalitions and the grand coalition are dually
essential. Thus E(Γ)∩DE(Γ) = {N} and the grand coalition alone does not characterize
the nucleolus in any game.
A collection of coalitions BS ⊆ 2N is said to be S-balanced if there exist positive weights
λT , T ∈ BS, such that
∑
T∈BS λT eT = eS. An N -balanced collection is simply called
balanced. A coalition S is called vital if for any S-balanced collection BS and any system
(λT )T∈BS of balancing weights for BS,
∑
T∈BS λTv(T ) < v(S). By definition every vital
coalition is essential. The concept was introduced by Gillies (1959) and further analyzed
by Shellshear and Sudhölter (2009). Huberman (1980) showed that vital coalitions do not
necessarily characterize the nucleolus. The next theorem provides a sufficient condition
for E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) to be a characterization set.
Theorem 17. Let Γ = (N, v) a monotonic game with a non-empty core. The collection
E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) forms a characterization set of N (Γ) if the grand coalition is vital.
2Strongly essential coalitions that were introduced in (Brânzei, Solymosi, and Tijs, 2005) are not
immune to this kind of failure, hence they do not form a characterization set for the nucleolus.
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Proof. If there is no cycle in the decomposition, then by Theorem 6 E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) is a
characterization set. By contradiction suppose that the grand coalition is vital, but there
is a cycle T1, T2, . . . , Tr in the decomposition. Note that we may assume without loss of
generality that the series alternates between inessentiality and dual inessentiality. If T`
and T`+1 were deemed redundant for the same reason (e.g. they are both inessential) then
the inequality that shows inessentiality of T` can be refined by the inequality that shows
inessentiality of T`+1. Let us assume that T1 is inessential  the proof is the same if T1 is
dually inessential. Thus using the definition of essentiality and dual essentiality
v(T1) ≤ v(T2) +
k1∑
j=1
v(S1j ) (1)
v(T2) ≤ v(T3) +
k2∑
j=1
v(S2j )− k2 · v(N) (2)
v(T4) ≤ v(T5) +
k3∑
j=1
v(S3j ) (3)
...
v(Tr) ≤ v(T1) +
kr∑
j=1
v(Srj )− kr · v(N) (4)
In words T1 is inessential because of the collection T2, S
1
1 , . . . , S
1
k1
(these are all essential
coalitions, thus the inequality cannot be refined any more). Then T2 is dually inessential
because of the collection T3, S
2
1 , . . . , S
2
k2
compose an overlapping decomposition of T2 (and
these are all dually essential). And so on until finally Tr is deemed redundant because
of T1, S
r
1 , . . . , S
r
kr
. Note that there may be coalitions among S11 , . . . , S
2
1 , . . . , S
r
1 , . . . , S
r
kr
that coincide. Using indicator functions and the conditions of inessentiality and dual
inessentiality.
eT1 = eT2 +
k1∑
j=1
eS1j (5)
eT2 = eT3 +
k2∑
j=1
eS2j − k2 · eN (6)
eT4 = eT5 +
k3∑
j=1
eS3j (7)
...
eTr = eT1 +
kr∑
j=1
eSrj − kr · eN (8)
12
Thus by summing (1)-(4) we obtain that
v(N) ≤ 1
k2 + k4 + · · ·+ kr
r∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
v(Sij)
while from (5)-(8) we gather that
eN =
1
k2 + k4 + · · ·+ kr
r∑
i=1
ki∑
j=1
eSij
i.e. the collection S11 , . . . , S
2
1 , . . . , S
r
1 , . . . , S
r
kr
is balanced. This contradicts the fact that
the grand coalition is vital.
4 Verifying the nucleolus
Faigle, Kern, and Kuipers (1998) conjecture the decision problem: "given x∗ ∈ RN , is
x∗ the nucleolus?" to be NP-hard in general. The most resourceful tool regarding this
problem is the criterion developed by (Kohlberg, 1971).
Theorem 18. (Kohlberg, 1971) Let Γ = (N, v) be a game with non-empty core and
let x ∈ I(Γ). Then x = N (Γ) if and only if for all y ∈ R the collection {∅ 6= S ⊂
N | satΓ(S, x) ≤ y} is balanced or empty.
The Kohlberg-criterion is often used to verify the nucleolus in practical computation
when the size of the player set is not too large. As the following LP shows it is easy
to tell whether a given collection of coalitions is balanced or not. Let S1, . . . , Sm be the
collection which balancedness is in question and let q ∈ [0, 1]m. For k = 1, . . . ,m let
p∗k = max qk
m∑
i=1
qieSi = eN (9)
q1, . . . , qm ≥ 0.
Lemma 19. The collection S1, . . . , Sm is balanced if and only if p
∗
k > 0 for each k =
1, . . . ,m.
Proof. Trivially p∗k > 0 is a necessary condition. Let a1, . . . , am ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary reals
such that a1 + · · ·+ am = 1. Furthermore let qk be an optimal solution of the kth LP. We
claim that λ =
∑m
i=1 aiq
i is a vector of balancing weights. Note that λj =
∑m
i=1 aiq
i
j > 0
as qjj = p
∗
j > 0 and
∑m
j=1 q
i
jeSj = eN for all i = 1, . . . ,m by (9). Then
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m∑
j=1
λjeSj =
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
aiq
i
jeSj =
m∑
i=1
ai
m∑
j=1
qijeSj = (a1 + · · ·+ am)eN = eN .
Sobolev (1975) extended Theorem 18 to the prenucleolus (where instead of x ∈ I(Γ)
we only require x to be an allocation). A direct consequence of the Sobolev-criterion is
that the prenucleolus of monotonic games is non-negative.
Theorem 20. Let Γ = (N, v) be a monotonic game and let z denote its prenucleolus,
then z(i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof. By contradiction suppose that z(i) < 0 for some i ∈ N . Let B0 contain the
coalitions with the smallest satisfaction values under z. By the Sobolev-criterion B0 is
a balanced collection. For every S ∈ B0, i ∈ S otherwise S ∪ {i} would have an even
smaller satisfaction due to the monotonicity of the characteristic function and the fact
that z(i) < 0. By balancedness of B0,
∑
S∈B0 λSeS = eN . As i ∈ S for all S ∈ B0 this
also means that
∑
S∈B0 λS = 1. Then for all j 6= i and for all S ∈ B0, S must contain j.
Thus the only coalition in B0 is the grand coalition. However the grand coalition has zero
satisfaction under any allocation, while coalition {i} has negative satisfaction under z,
which contradicts that B0 contains the coalitions with the smallest satisfaction values.
Reijnierse and Potters (1998) proved that for every game (N, v) there exists a collection
with at most 2(n − 1) coalitions that determine the nucleolus. Although finding these
coalitions is as hard as computing the nucleolus itself. Unfortunately this result does not
make the verification of the nucleolus belong toNP . Even if somehow we could effortlessly
put the satisfaction values of the 2n coalition in increasing order. It can happen that these
2(n−1) coalitions are scattered among the different balanced coalition arrays and we have
to evaluate exponential many of them before we could confirm that the given allocation
is indeed the nucleolus.
The Kohlberg-criterion applied to games with coalition formation restrictions yields
the following theorem.
Theorem 21. Let F be a characterization set and x be an imputation of the game Γ with
C(Γ) 6= ∅. Then x = N (Γ) if and only if for all y ∈ R the collection {S ∈ F | satΓ(S, x) ≤
y} is balanced or empty.
For a proof see (Maschler, Potters, and Tijs, 1992). A similar criterion appears
in (Groote Schaarsberg, Borm, Hamers, and Reijnierse, 2013). With the help of the
Kohlberg-criterion the problem of finding the nucleolus is reduced to finding the right
characterization set.
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5 The nucleolus of bankruptcy games
The game theoretic analysis of bankruptcy games was initiated by O'Neill (1982), but
Aumann and Maschler (1985) made the problem really popular3 by proving the equiv-
alence of the Talmud-rule and the nucleolus. Although their result was spectacular the
proof used complicated concepts like the reduced game or kernel. Many believed that an
elementary proof should exists for this problem. Benoît (1997) was the first to publish
a simplification, although he still needed long pages of computation to reach the desired
result. Recently Fleiner and Sziklai (2012) managed to provide an elementary and in-
structive proof with the help of the hydraulic framework that was developed by Kaminski
(2000).
The differences between the approaches are remarkable. The hydraulic proof seems to
be straightforward enough but the elapsed time between the original and this proof signals
that a few subtle tricks were needed to overcome the difficulties. It seems that for each
particular game class a different idea is needed to compute the nucleolus. Bankruptcy
games make a textbook examples why characterization sets are so resourceful. The ben-
efits of Theorem 6, 11 and 17 all come together. Here  after defining bankruptcy games
 we disclose a simple treatment of the problem, which is barely two-page long.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of creditors. The bankruptcy problem4 is defined as a
pair (d,E) where E ∈ R+ represents the firm's liquidation value (or estate/endowment)
and d ∈ Rn+ is the collection of claims with
∑n
i=1 di > E. A solution of a bankruptcy
problem is a vector x ∈ Rn+ such that
∑n
i xi = E.
The characteristic function corresponding to the bankruptcy problem (d,E) is
v(d,E)(S) = max{E − d(N \ S), 0}
By definition, this is the value that is left from the firm's liquidation value E =
v(d,E)(N) after the claim of each player of the complement coalition N \ S has been
satisfied. Coalition S can achieve v(d,E)(S) without any effort. Note that v(d,E) is non-
negative and supermodular. Hence bankruptcy games are convex, which implies that they
are superadditive and monotonic as well.
The hydraulic proof of Fleiner and Sziklai (2012) hints that only the singleton coali-
tions and the n − 1 person coalitions are relevant in the computation of the nucleolus.
Let us investigate whether any of the characterization sets coincide with this collection of
coalitions.
3After Aumann and Maschler's seminal paper the literature virtually exploded. A recent comprehen-
sive survey of Thomson (2015) lists nearly 200 references!
4Sometime it is referred as the claims or rationing problem.
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Lemma 22. Let (d,E) be a bankruptcy problem and Γ = (N, v(d,E)) be the corresponding
bankruptcy game. Then E(Γ) is a subset of the singleton coalitions, the grand coalition
and coalitions with non-zero characteristic function value.
Proof. Let S ⊂ N be such that |S| > 1 and v(d,E)(S) = 0. It follows from monotonicity
of v(d,E) that v(d,E)(T ) = 0 for any T ⊂ S. Thus for any partition S1, . . . , Sk of S,
v(d,E)(S) ≤ v(d,E)(S1) + · · ·+ v(d,E)(Sk).
That is, S is inessential.
In fact E(Γ) contains exactly the singleton coalitions, the grand coalition and coalitions
with non-zero characteristic function value. We will come back to this question later, since
we do not need it for the computation of the nucleolus.
Lemma 23. Let (d,E) be a bankruptcy problem and Γ = (N, v(d,E)) be the corresponding
bankruptcy game. Then DE(Γ) is a subset of the n−1 player coalitions, the grand coalition
and coalitions with characteristic function value of zero.
Proof. By default DE(Γ) contains all the n− 1 player coalitions. Let S ⊂ N be such that
|S| < n− 1 and v(d,E)(S) > 0. It follows from monotonicity of v(d,E) that v(d,E)(T ) > 0 for
any S ⊂ T . Thus for any overlapping decomposition T1, . . . , Tk of S,
E − d(N \ S) ≤ E − d(N \ S)
E − d(N \ S) ≤ kE − d(N \ S)− (k − 1)E
E − d(N \ S) ≤ E − d(N \ T1) + · · ·+ E − d(N \ Tk)− (k − 1)v(d,E)(N)
v(d,E)(S) ≤ v(d,E)(T1) + · · ·+ v(d,E)(Tk)− (k − 1)v(d,E)(N)
where we used that d(N \S) = d(N \T1)+· · ·+d(N \Tk). Thus S is dually inessential.
It seem that neither of these two characterization sets coincide with the desired col-
lection. A natural idea is to examine the intersection of these two sets.
Observation 24. Let (d,E) be a bankruptcy problem and Γ = (N, v(d,E)) be the corre-
sponding bankruptcy game. Then E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) is subset of the grand coalition, n − 1
person coalitions with non-zero characteristic function value and singleton coalitions with
characteristic function value of zero.
Although Observation 24 gives us the collection of coalitions that we have looked for,
we still need to prove that E(Γ) ∩DE(Γ) is actually a characterization set itself. For this
we will show that the grand coalition is vital.
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Theorem 25. Let (d,E) be a bankruptcy problem and Γ = (N, v(d,E)) be the corresponding
bankruptcy game. Then
{i ∈ N | v(d,E)(i) = 0} ∪ {N \ i | i ∈ N, v(d,E)(N \ i) > 0} ∪ {N}
is a characterization set for N (Γ).
Proof. Due to Theorem 17 we only need to prove that the grand coalition is vital. Suppose
by contradiction that the grand coalition is not vital, that is, there exists a collection
B ⊂ 2N and positive balancing weights {λT > 0 | T ∈ B} such that
∑
T∈B λT eT = eN and
v(d,E)(N) ≤
∑
T∈B
λTv(d,E)(T ). (10)
Let B+ ⊆ B denote those coalitions for which v(d,E)(T ) is not zero, then Eq. (10) can be
written as
v(d,E)(N) ≤
∑
T∈B+
λTv(d,E)(T ) =
∑
T∈B+
λT (E − d(N \ T )).
Note that
∑
T∈B+ λT > 1 otherwise v(d,E)(N) = E >
∑
T∈B+ λT (E − d(N \ T )). Then
v(d,E)(N) ≤
∑
T∈B+
λT (E − d(N \ T )) =
∑
T∈B+
λT (E − d(N) + d(T )) =∑
T∈B+
λT (E − d(N)) +
∑
T∈B+
λTd(T ) ≤
∑
T∈B+
λT (E − d(N)) +
∑
T∈B
λTd(T ).
Using that
∑
T∈B λTd(T ) = d(N) we obtain
E − d(N) ≤
∑
T∈B+
λT (E − d(N)),
1 ≥
∑
T∈B+
λT ,
which contradicts that
∑
T∈B+ λT > 1.
Since the grand coalition is vital E(Γ)∩DE(Γ) is a characterization set. From Lemma
22 and 23 it follows that
E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) ⊆ {i ∈ N | v(d,E)(i) = 0} ∪ {N \ i | i ∈ N, v(d,E)(N \ i) > 0} ∪ {N}.
Any enlargement of a characterization set is a characterization set by Corollary 7, thus
we are done.
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We obtained a collection  whose size is linear in the number of players  that charac-
terize the nucleolus in every bankruptcy game. For sake of completeness we provide the
couterparts of Lemma 22 and 23.
Theorem 26. Let (d,E) be a bankruptcy problem and Γ = (N, v(d,E)) be the corresponding
bankruptcy game. Then
a. E(Γ) contains the singleton coalitions, the grand coalition and coalitions with non-zero
characteristic function value,
b. DE(Γ) contains the n − 1 player coalitions, the grand coalition and coalitions with
characteristic function value of zero.
Proof. In light of Lemma 22 it is enough to prove that coalitions with non-zero char-
acteristic function value are essential. By contradiction suppose that v(d,E)(S) > 0 and
S is inessential. Then there exists a partition T1, . . . , Tk+1 of S such that v(d,E)(S) ≤∑k+1
i=1 v(d,E)(Ti). Some of the v(d,E)(Ti) values may be zeros. By uniting these coalitions
the characteristic function may only increase. Thus we may assume that v(Ti) > 0 for
i = 1, . . . , k and v(d,E)(Tk+1) = 0 where we allow Tk+1 to be the empty set. Notice that
k ≥ 2 in this setting.
v(d,E)(S) ≤
k+1∑
i=1
v(d,E)(Ti) =
k∑
i=1
v(d,E)(Ti),
E − d(N \ S) ≤
k∑
i=1
(E − d(N \ Ti)) = k(E − d(N)) +
k∑
i=1
d(Ti).
By subtracting
∑k
i=1 c(Ti) from both sides and estimating the sum from below we get
E − d(N) ≤ E − d(N \ Tk+1) = E − d(N \ S)−
k∑
i=1
d(Ti) ≤ k(E − d(N)),
1 ≥ k.
which contradicts that k ≥ 2.
For the second part of the Theorem we need prove that coalitions with characteristic
function value of zero are dually essential. By contradiction suppose that v(d,E)(S) =
max{E − d(N \ S), 0} = 0 and S is dually inessential. By perturbing the claims with
a small positive number we can always achieve that no collection of claims sum up to
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the estate, therefore we may also suppose that E − d(N \ S) < 0. Then there exists an
overlapping decomposition T1, . . . , Tk, Tk+1, . . . , T` of S such that
v(d,E)(S) ≤
∑`
i=1
v(d,E)(Ti)− (`− 1)v(d,E)(N).
Some of the v(d,E)(Ti) values may be zeros. We may assume that v(Ti) > 0 for i = 1, . . . , k
and v(d,E)(Ti) = 0 for i = k + 1, . . . , ` where we allow k = `.
0 = v(d,E)(S) ≤
∑`
i=1
v(d,E)(Ti)− (`− 1)v(d,E)(N) =
k∑
i=1
v(d,E)(Ti)− (`− 1)v(d,E)(N) =
k(E − d(N)) +
k∑
i=1
d(Ti)− (`− 1)E ≤ k(E − d(N)) + (k − 1)d(N) + d(S)− (`− 1)E ≤
kE − d(N) + d(S)− (k − 1)E = E − d(N \ S) < 0.
which is clearly a contradiction. Note that we used that
k∑
i=1
d(Ti) ≤ (k − 1)d(N) + d(S),
which follows from the fact that T1, . . . , Tk, Tk+1, . . . , T` compose an overlapping decom-
position of S.
In view of Theorem 26 we can easily construct a bankruptcy game where every coalition
is dually essential or a game where every coalition is essential. What is more we can
define a game Γ with n players where both the size of E(Γ) and DE(Γ) is O(2n). Instead
of proving that the grand coalition is vital we could simply derive Theorem 25 from
Theorem 6. This method is also instructive since it shreds some light on the structure of
satisfaction values, thus we present it as well.
Second proof. We need to prove that when we exclude coalition S because it is (du-
ally) inessential, then there is an (overlapping decomposition) partition of S, contain-
ing coalitions that belong to E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) and have smaller satisfaction values than S.
There are two cases. If v(d,E)(S) = 0, then by monotonicity v(d,E)(i) = 0 for all i ∈ S.
Thus satΓ(S, x) ≥ satΓ(i, x) for all i ∈ S and for any core allocation x. Furthermore
i ∈ E(Γ) ∩DE(Γ) for all i ∈ S and naturally eS can be expressed as a linear combination
of {ei : i ∈ S}. If v(d,E)(S) > 0, then by monotonicity v(d,E)(N \ i) > 0 for all i ∈ N \ S.
The collection {N \ i | i ∈ N \ S} is an overlapping decomposition of S, furthermore for
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any core allocation x (cf. Lemma 23)
v(d,E)(S) ≤
∑
i∈N\S
v(d,E)(N \ i)− (|N \ S| − 1)v(d,E)(N)
x(S)− v(d,E)(S) ≥ −
∑
i∈N\S
v(d,E)(N \ i) + (|N \ S| − 1)x(N) + x(S)
x(S)− v(d,E)(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
x(N \ i)−
∑
i∈N\S
v(d,E)(N \ i)
satΓ(S, x) ≥
∑
i∈S
satΓ(N \ i, x)
Thus satΓ(S, x) ≥ satΓ(N \ i, x) for all i ∈ N \ S. Again N \ i ∈ E(Γ) ∩DE(Γ) for all
i ∈ N \ S and eS can be expressed as a linear combination of {eN\i : i ∈ N \ S} and eN .
By Theorem 6 we conclude that E(Γ) ∩ DE(Γ) is a characterization set for the nucleolus
of Γ.
6 Literature overview
There are many ingenious techniques to compute the nucleolus of various classes of co-
operative games. A standard method is to verify the nucleolus through the satisfaction
vector, i.e. guessing what the solution is, then checking whether the satisfaction vector of
the proposed allocation is lexicographically maximal. For example such a method is used
to find the nucleolus of voting games with a non-empty core (Elkind, Goldberg, Goldberg,
and Wooldridge, 2009) and the nucleolus of standard tree games (Megiddo, 1978).
A more advanced technique of this kind when the balancedness of the satisfaction
vector is examined. The Kohlberg-criterion is mostly used in combination with other
methods as proving balancedness for abstract coalition structures can be a challenging
task. In comparison verifying balancedness of a given collection of coalitions can be done
with a simple LP (cf. Lemma 19). The Chinese postman game that was introduced by
Granot, Hamers, Kuipers, and Maschler (2011) provides an example where balancedness
is crucial in the proof. The effectiveness of the painting algorithm of Maschler, Potters,
and Reijnierse (2010) is also proven with the help of Kohlberg-criterion.
The application of the axiomatization of the nucleolus is more intricate. It is usually
hard to confirm whether a solution admits the reduced game property. Only when the
structure of the game is simple enough, that is, the reduced game falls into the same game
class, it is possible to use the axiomatization5. Brânzei, Iñarra, Tijs, and Zarzuelo (2006)
used this technique the find the nucleolus of airport profit games. Another perhaps more
famous example that uses reduced game property is the Theorem of Aumann and Maschler
(1985) which states that the Talmud-rule yields the nucleolus in case of bankruptcy games.
5For instance the reduced game of a standard tree game is not a standard tree game.
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The linear programming approach received substantial attention. The sequential LP
of Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1979) was the first that was suitable for computational
purposes. In general this method needs O(4n) number of linear programs with constraint
coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. Since then there have been many attempts to improve the
computation process either by restraining the number of LPs or by finding a unique
minimization problem with minimal number of constraints. Sankaran (1991) provided a
method that needs O(2n) number of LPs with constraint coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. Later
Fromen (1997) improved his results. Potters, Reijnierse, and Ansing (1996) proposed a
fast algorithm to find the nucleolus of any game with non-empty imputation set. This
algorithm is based on solving a prolonged simplex algorithm. It requires solving n − 1
linear programs with O(2n) number of rows and columns. The most recent result is
by Puerto and Perea (2013). They offered a unique minimization problem with O(4n)
constraints where the coefficients are from the set {−1, 0, 1}. An interesting addition to
this topic is provided by Guajardo and Jörnsten (2014). They collect examples from the
literature where the nucleolus was miscalculated and analyze what went wrong.
By itself the linear programming approach is not an effective tool as we either need a
sequential LP with exponential many programs or a unique maximization problem with
exponential many constraints. The LP approach is often used to calculate the nucleolus
in practice when the number of players is limited and no theory is available. There are
quite a few instances when the opposite is true: an LP helps to derive a theoretical result,
for an example see (Kamiyama, 2014) or (Kern and Paulusma, 2003).
Surprisingly few papers use the concept of characterization-sets explicitly  the main
theoretical advancement that was developed parallel by Granot, Granot, and Zhu (1998)
and Reijnierse and Potters (1998). Some papers like (Kamiyama, 2014) and (Brânzei,
Solymosi, and Tijs, 2005) exploit this idea but there are many others which use it un-
knowingly. For instance Maschler, Potters, and Reijnierse (2010) identify a collection that
determines the core and nucleolus of standard tree games which is in fact a characteriza-
tion set. However they do not make the connection between their method and the above
mentioned two papers.
The primary contribution of this paper is the expansion of the theory of characteriza-
tion sets. When the game in question is well-structured, characterization sets can simplify
the proof substantially. Even when the structure is more complicated characterization sets
can make the proof significantly simpler or at least possible.
Naturally characterization sets do not make other approaches obsolete. The algorithm
for the nucleolus of bankruptcy games uncovered by Aumann and Maschler (1985) is
considerably faster than the LP approach. Also from didactical point of view the hydraulic
representation of Kaminski (2000) is much more instructive. The main advantage of
characterization sets is their algebraic formalism. The proofs need less bag-tricks and
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more mechanical computation which is perhaps aesthetically less pleasing but much more
effective in terms of results.
Finally let us stress that the four universal characterization sets that we analyzed
in this paper can only help when the game in question has a non-empty core. Göthe-
Lundgren, Jörnsten, and Värbrand (1996) computed the nucleolus of a vehicle routing
game using the concept of essential coalitions. However as Chardaire (2001) pointed out
these games are not necessarily balanced, hence their approach is flawed.
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